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SHIRKING, OPPORTUNISM, SELF-DELUSION
AND MORE: THE AGENCY PROBLEM LIVES ON
Jayne W. Barnard*
One would think, after nearly a century of effort to limit the
self-serving and wealth-destroying practices of corporate executives
and their board of directors, Americans could finally feel confident
that the goals of corporate leaders were now fully aligned with those
of their investors.' We should now be able to observe these men and
women acting with integrity, diligence, and grace.
Investor anxiety about shirking, opportunism, self-promotion,
and outsized greed should be, one would think, an artifact of the
past.
Alas, we cannot say we have achieved that enlightened state of
affairs. It is still all too possible to find evidence of executive sloth,
corruption, mendacity, and hubris. All the gatekeepers, media
scoldings, scholarly inquiries, and judicial sermons aimed at curbing
the agency problem have failed to restrain the worst in human
impulses. Should we be surprised?
In thinking about the failures of the law and the culture of
business to counteract the predictable weaknesses (and sometimes
worse) of human beings, several high-profile examples quickly come
to mind: Richard Fuld of Lehman Brothers, Jon Corzine of MF
Global Holdings, Ken Lewis of Bank of America, Angelo Mozilo of
Countrywide Financial, Aubrey McClendon of Chesapeake Energy,
and Rajat Gupta of McKinsey and Goldman Sachs.
There are other corporate leaders, however, whose stories are
less well known, and these individuals are the focus of this Essay:
Russell Wasendorf Sr., former CEO of Peregrine Financial Group;
Lee B. Farkas, former CEO of the mortgage firm Taylor Bean &
Whitaker; Albert "Jack" Stanley, former chairman and CEO of KBR,
* James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School.
Thanks to Alan Palmiter for putting together such an eclectic and informative
program; Emily Gomes, J.D. 2014 for helpful research and cite checking; my
scientist friends who vetted some portions of this Essay and kept me from
making excessive claims; and the editors at the Wake Forest Law Review who
turned the manuscript around in record time.
1. I trace the efforts to limit CEO self-interest to the seminal case of
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919), though surely CEO self-
interest predates that decision.
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Inc.; Gilbert Fiorentino, former group CEO of Systemax, Inc.; and
Jeffery S. Fraser, former CEO of NIC, Inc.
Each of these men, in different ways, abused his position and
profited from that abuse. Each of them was removed or pushed from
office. Each of them has been publicly disgraced. Three of these
men are now in prison; two have not been criminally charged.
In recounting these men's stories, I proceed with considerable
regret. I have read (and written) some of the literature extolling the
virtues of work: work can provide happiness, meaning, and dignity
in life.2 A productive work life can stimulate a creative mind,
provide solace for a troubled soul, generate opportunities to care for
and elevate others, and foster a sense of accomplishment, service,
gratitude, and awe. 3
One would think that those men and women privileged to work
at the highest levels of the economic pyramid, as corporate chief
executives, would treat their work as a profound gift. After all, the
work of a senior executive, unlike the work of most people in the
world, is not boring, humiliating, or physically punishing. It is
stimulating, empowering, and financially rewarding. Some people
spend their entire careers longing for-and jousting for-the
position of CEO.4 So why do some of the elite executives who have
won their respective tournaments debase their work-and
themselves-by squandering their gift?
This Essay offers four possible explanations: (1) the obstinacy of
self-interest, (2) the influence of power on one's inclination to take
risks, (3) the often toxic feedback loop of organizational and
financial success, and (4) some form of mental derangement.
The Essay will unfold as follows: Part I will offer brief
narratives of the downfalls of the five once-successful corporate chief
executives I have identified. Parts II-V will consider the factors that
may have influenced their behavioral excesses.
2. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Rule 10b-5 and the "Unfitness" Question,
47 ARiz. L. REV. 9, 12-13 (2005) (noting the powerful, debilitating impact of
blacklisting and other exclusions from meaningful work).
3. There are dozens of books now on the market developing these themes.
One of the most influential books examining the transformative power of work
is MIALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI, FLOW: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF OPTIMAL EXPERIENCE
(1990). Other books offering valuable insights include THE DALAI LAMA &
HOWARD C. CUTLER, THE ART OF HAPPINESS AT WORK (2003); ROBERT GREENE,
MASTERY (2012); DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT
MOTIVATES US (2009); and HUGH WHELCHEL, How THEN SHOULD WE WORK?
REDISCOVERING THE BIBLICAL DOCTRINE OF WORK (2012).
4. See Donald C. Langevoort, Overcoming Resistance to Diversity in the
Executive Suite: Grease, Grit, and the Corporate Tournament, 61 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1615, 1624-30 (2004) (describing the process by which corporate
employees ascend the power ladder and in which certain characteristics-
including self-confidence, competitiveness, and an "appetite for risk"-are
rewarded).
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Specifically, Part II will consider the pervasive influence of self-
interest in the business environment. While recent scholarship on
human evolution has focused on the tendency toward altruism and
cooperation, the underlying drumbeat of evolutionary biology is self-
interest, self-aggrandizement, and greed.
Part III will explore the relationship between the accumulation
of power and increased risk-taking. Recent laboratory studies by
behavioral psychologists show that giving some persons even a hint
of power over others encourages them to take on more risk. The
causal agent here is the pleasure-seeking architecture-the
"approach system"-of the brain.
Part IV will examine some recent neuroscience literature
exploring the so-called "winner effect." Scientists now recognize
that an animal engaged in some form of combat, if victorious, will
exit the competition with an elevated level of testosterone. The
higher the hormone level, the more willing the winner is to engage
in further combat. This cycle continues until the winner becomes
overloaded with testosterone and, rather than going forward as a
canny and effective combatant, becomes a foolish and risk-defying
one. Annihilation often follows. The impact of testosterone,
moreover, does not stop with animals in the wild. It has recently
been measured, and the "winner effect" observed, among traders in
the City of London. I will argue that the "winner effect" can also
affect CEOs.
Part V will touch on the most reductive story one can tell about
what can go wrong with transgressive CEOs. Sometimes, they are
psychopaths.
Part VI will conclude.
I. FIVE DISHEARTENING STORIES
On nearly a daily basis, a reader of the business or popular
press can find stories of high-status people running amok.5 In this
Essay, I will add five more. The following stories of business
misconduct were not randomly chosen, nor were they painstakingly
tracked down. Rather, I selected these stories to reflect different
industries, different forms of wrongdoing, different lifestyles and
personality types, and different official sanctions. These stories are
all infuriating as well as heartbreaking. The voices of the victims of
these men's misconduct-including their customers, employees, and
families-are rarely heard.
A. Russell R. Wasendorf, Sr.
Russell R. Wasendorf, Sr. pleaded guilty in September 2012 to
multiple counts of mail fraud, making false statements to
5. Silvio Berlusconi, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, David Petraeus, and
Anthony Weiner immediately come to mind.
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regulators, and embezzlement in connection with his looting of the
Peregrine Financial Group ("PFG"), a leading commodities futures
brokerage firm of which he was founder and CEO.6 During most of
the twenty years Wasendorf was running PFG, prosecutors said, he
"was taking hundreds of millions of dollars of his customers' money
to cover losses and live large."7 U.S. District Judge Linda R. Reade
sentenced Wasendorf to fifty years in prison.8 She also ordered him
to pay more than $200 million in restitution to his victims.9
Wasendorf began his life as a "small-town Iowa boy, raised in
hard times by a widowed mother. [He started his] business in the
back room of a barber shop before setting out to the big city."10
Throughout his time in the big city-Chicago-Wasendorf
sought the approval of the local financial community. "He felt he
wasn't always granted the respect he deserved."11
So, in a move eerily reminiscent of Bernie Madoff, Wasendorf
joined an influential advisory group of the National Futures
Association, the self-regulatory organization overseeing the futures
industry. 12 In another move similar to Madoff, he "invested in
technological capabilities to create one of the futures industry's first
platforms for electronic trading."13
After achieving success in Chicago, Wasendorf relocated his
firm back to Cedar Falls, Iowa. 14 He "bought a private jet and built
a $24 million state-of-the-art office, touting the move as a template
for revitalizing small-town America."15  According to a family
lawyer, "[WasendorfJ wanted to come back to Cedar Falls to be the
big man."16
6. P.J. Huffstutter et al., Special Report: Iowa Broker Built Empire on a
Lie Concealed in a Postal Box, REUTERS (Sept. 24, 2012, 7:52 AM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/24/us-wasendorf-life-one
-idUSBRE88NOEJ20120924.
7. Id.
8. Peter Lattman & David V. Henderson, Ex-Peregrine Chief Sentenced to
50 Years in Prison, DEALBOOK (Feb. 1, 2013, 8:33 PM), http://query.nytimes.com
/gst/fullpage.html?res=9EO2EEDD103AF932A35751COA9659D8B63.
9. Karen Gullo & Edvard Petterson, Peregrine's Wasendorf Gets 50 Years
for Theft of Millions, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-01-31/u-s-wants-peregrine-s-wasendorf-imprisoned-for-50
-years.html.
10. Huffstutter et al., supra note 6.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Russell R. Wasendorf Sr., BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK,
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/private/person.asp?personld
=39832716&privcapld=4473790 (last visited June 11, 2013).
14. Huffstutter et al., supra note 6.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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1. Wasendorf's Fraud
In 1993, shortly after Wasendorf started the firm, PFG was
investigated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
("CFTC"), apparently for a violation of the net capital rule.17
According to Wasendorfs confession-actually a suicide note-
written in July 2012, that investigation was the genesis of his
fraud.18 "I had no access to additional capital and I was forced into a
difficult decision: Should I go out of business or cheat?" the letter
states.19 "I guess my ego was too big to admit failure. So I cheated.
I falsified the very core of the financial documents of PFG, the Bank
Statements."20
Wasendorfs scheme was "remarkably crude."21 He diverted all
the firm's bank statements to a private postal box-P.O. Box 706,
Cedar Falls, lowa.2 2 Then, when regulators asked for confirmation
of how much money was in the firm's accounts, Wasendorf simply
generated false bank statements on his computer and forged replies
purporting to come from the bank.23 In this way, he was able to
keep the CFTC off the trail of his defalcations. 24
The government alleged that, over a twenty-year period,
Wasendorf misappropriated more than $200 million in PFG
customer funds,25 representing 13,000 victims. 26 In his confession,
Wasendorf said that he had spent most of the money to keep his
business afloat.27 He also spent some of the money to pay fines for
PFG's involvement in a customer's Ponzi scheme. 28
2. Wasendorf's Self-Image
On his personal website, Wasendorf described himself as "a
noted writer and educator, having written or co-written six books
about futures and trading."29 He sat on the President's Committee
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Lattman & Henderson, supra note 8.
22. Huffstutter et al., supra note 6.
23. Id.
24. This description of Wasendorf's conduct seems to suggest a very odd
fraud. Surely, the CFTC should have been communicating directly with the
bank, not with Peregrine, to verify the firm's bank balances. So, the use of a
phony post office box for delivery of the bank statements does not seem to
answer completely the question how Wasendorf fooled the CFTC for so long.
25. Huffstutter et al., supra note 6.
26. Lattman & Henderson, supra note 8.
27. Ryan Schlader, Peregrine CEO Wasendorf to Plead Guilty to Fraud,
REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2012, 1:57 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/09/12
/us-peregrine-ceo-agreement-idUSBRE88A1I920120912.
28. Id.
29. PFG Best's Leadership, PFGBEST, http://www.pfgbest.com/about
/russsr.asp (last visited June 11, 2013).
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of both the University of Iowa and the University of Northern
Iowa.30 Through his family foundation, Peregrine Charities,
Wasendorf funded research for rare childhood diseases. 31
His biggest impact, though, was on the city of Cedar Falls, home
to the University of Northern Iowa. Wasendorf built his firm's new
headquarters there and relocated many PFG executives from
Chicago to Cedar Falls.3 2
To entice them, he built the new headquarters next to the
exclusive Beaver Hills Country Club. 33 The offices had a day-care
center with an outdoor playground, a Montessori school for the
employees' children, and free breakfast and lunch for the firm's
nearly 150 workers.34
Wasendorf opened an upscale Italian restaurant nearby and
"paid for the entire staff to travel to Italy . . . 'How can I expect
them to prepare and cook north Italian food if they haven't
experienced it?' Wasendorf [asked]."35
In the liquidation of PFG's assets, the receiver had to sell
Wasendorfs Hawkes Beechcraft jet and a $100,000 wine collection. 36
Hundreds of thousands of dollars in charitable contributions were
put in jeopardy of clawback. 37
3. Wasendorf's Remorse
In his confession/suicide note, which was addressed to his son,
Wasendorf wrote:
By the time you read this I will have taken my life. I beg for
your forgiveness. I have written my final confession that will
be discovered with my body. I know you will be shocked to
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Lattman & Henderson, supra note 8.
33. Huffstutter et al., supra note 6.
34. Azam Ahmed & Peter Lattman, At Peregrine Financial, Signs of
Trouble Seemingly Missed for Years, DEALBOOK (July 12, 2012, 2:18 PM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/07/12/at-peregrine-financial-signs-of-trouble
-seemingly-missed-for-years/.
35. Lattman & Henderson, supra note 8.
36. Ann Saphir & Tom Polansek, Jet-Owning Peregrine CEO Russell
Wasendorf, Sr.: "I Don't Live a Lavish Lifestyle," HUFFINGTON PosT (July 18,
2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/18/russell-wasendorf
-sr-peregrine n_.1684131.html.
37. Emily Christensen, Hospitals, Universities May be Forced to Return
Donations from Peregrine, GAZETTE (July 18, 2012, 11:45 AM),
http://thegazette.com/2012/07/18/hospitals-universities-may-be-forced-to-return
-donations-from-peregrine/.
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discover my crimes. It all started about 20 years ago. I never
wanted you to know the kind of guy I really was.38
He also commented on the pressure he felt from regulators: "I don't
feel bad having deceived the Regulators-the CFTC (the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission) and the National Futures
Association. 39 These Regulators are not the Police of the Industry
they are the Gestapo!"40
Finally, for what it was worth, Wasendorf offered this
statement of contrition: "I have committed fraud. For this I feel
constant and intense guilt. I am very remorseful that my greatest
transgressions have been to my fellow man."4 1
B. Lee B. Farkas
Lee B. Farkas was convicted in April 2011 for his role in
masterminding one of the largest bank fraud schemes in history.42
"As chairman of [the mortgage firm Taylor, Bean & Whitaker], Mr.
Farkas orchestrated a plot that caused the demise of Colonial Bank
[of Montgomery, Alabama] and cheated investors and the
government out of billions of dollars," said federal prosecutors. 43
U.S. District Court Judge Leonie Brinkema sentenced Farkas to
thirty years in prison. She also ordered him to pay $38.5 million in
restitution. 44
1. Farkas's Fraud
Mr. Farkas's $2.9 billion scheme began in 2002, prosecutors
[alleged], when Taylor Bean was facing mounting losses. To
hide the losses, Taylor Bean executives secretly overdrew the
firm's accounts with Colonial Bank. [Taylor Bean], aiming to
cover up the overdrafts, sold Colonial about $1.5 billion in
38. Russell Wasendorf Sr.'s Suicide Note to His Son, Deal Journal, WALL
ST. J. (July 27, 2012, 4:41 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2012/07/17/russell
-wasendorf-sr-s-suicide-note-to-his-son/.
39. Saphir & Polansek, supra note 36.
40. Id.
41. Wasendorf: "I Have Committed Fraud," Deal Journal, WALL ST. J. (July
13, 2012, 3:01 PM), http://blogs.wsj.comldeals/2012/07/13/wasendorf-i-have
-committed-fraud.
42. Tom Schoenberg, Ex-Taylor Bean Chairman Farkas Found Guilty on
All 14 Counts in Fraud Case, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 20, 2011, 12:01 AMV),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-04-19/ex-taylor-bean-chairman-convicted
-of-conspiracy-fraud-1-.html.
43. Ben Protess, Mortgage Executive Receives 30-Year Sentence, DEALBOOK
(June 30, 2011, 8:40 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/30/mortgage
-executive-receives-30-year-sentence).
44. Id.
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"worthless" and "fake" mortgages. 45 The government, in turn,
guaranteed the bogus loans. 46
Colonial Bank ultimately filed for bankruptcy in August 2009.47
It was the sixth-largest bank failure in U.S. history.48 Taylor Bean
also ended up in liquidation.49
Importantly, and as often happens with big-time defrauders,50
Farkas began his career with a small-time scam, followed by larger
and larger scams. In 2002, when Taylor Bean was a tiny firm,
Farkas tried to sell eight fraudulent mortgages to Fannie Mae. 51
"To make things even worse, the mortgages-all of which defaulted
without a single payment being made-listed Mr. Farkas as the
borrower."52 At his trial, Farkas testified that the attempted sale of
mortgages to Fannie Mae had been a mistake by a Taylor Bean
employee. 53 Those mortgages had been created, Farkas testified, to
be used as collateral to get money from a bank. 54 Whatever may
have been the case at the time, somebody was being defrauded.55
Fannie Mae refused to do further business with Taylor Bean.56
Farkas then upped the stakes of his fraud when he began
selling phony loans to Colonial Bank in order to raise capital. 57
Colonial, in turn, used the Taylor Bean mortgages as collateral for
further borrowing.
Two major European banks, Deutsche Bank and BNP Paribas,
thought their $1.68 billion in loans was fully secured by
collateral. But only a tenth of that collateral was real.
Colonial had lent hundreds of millions on the security of
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Patrick Fitzgerald, Taylor Bean Liquidation Plan is Cleared,
WALL ST. J. (July 22, 2011, 6:38 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424053111903461104576462574010327268.html.
50. See Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence,
113 PENN ST. L. REV. 189, 201-06 (2008) (recounting the careers of several
recidivist defrauders).
51. Floyd Norris, After Years of Red Flags, a Conviction, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
22, 2011, at Bl.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Farkas may not have appreciated the irony of his testimony. In
suggesting that he, personally, had done nothing wrong in 2002 or ever
thereafter, he revealed three characteristics of the classic con man: blaming
others for his own wrongdoing, failing to recognize the harm he had done, and
showing no remorse. These are the classic signs of someone with antisocial
personality disorder, a lifelong mental condition. See Barnard, supra note 50,
at 214-16 (describing APD and its role in confidence crimes).
56. Norris, supra note 51.
57. Id.
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mortgage loans that were either nonexistent or had already
been sold to someone else.58
And, when Farkas then tried to help Colonial recapitalize and
qualify for $570 million in Troubled Asset Relief Program funds in
2008, he designed a complex scheme that required him to raise $150
million from outside investors.59 "[Farkas] told Colonial and the
Treasury Department that he had done so, but that turned out to be
a lie. He attributed the misinformation to an innocent
mistake . . . ."60
Further, when he set out to buy his private jet, Farkas did so by
"taking out mortgages on non-existent condominiums." 61 At one
point, he boasted to a colleague that he "could rob a bank with a
pencil."62
2. Farkas's Self-Image
In seeking a lengthy sentence for Farkas, the government
argued that Farkas had enjoyed a "'lifestyle of ostentatious wealth,'
with 'little to no regard' for the thousands of employees who lost
their jobs when the fraud imploded."63 "Mr. Farkas ... diverted
more than $40 million from Taylor Bean and Colonial to 'finance his
lifestyle,' prosecutors said. He used the money ... to buy a private
jet, vacation homes, and a collection of vintage cars."64
Throughout his leadership of Taylor Bean, Farkas indeed
enjoyed a high public profile. He was a prominent player in South
Florida's gay community.65  He owned three popular bars in
Atlanta66 and another bar in Fort Lauderdale. 67 Farkas was said to
own expensive real estate "up and down the east coast."68 His fleet
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Patrick G. Lee, White Collar Criminal Hopes Good Deeds Will Lead to
Lighter Sentence, Law Blog, WALL ST. J. (June 29, 2011, 3:00 , PM),
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2011/06/29/white-collar-criminal-hopes-good-deeds-will
-lead-to-lighter-sentence/.
64. Protess, supra note 43.
65. Gay Mortgage CEO Lee Farkas Indicted in Billion Dollar Fraud
Scheme, TOWLEROAD (June 17, 2010), http://www.towleroad.com/.m/2010/06/gay
-mortgage-ceo-lee-farkas-indicted-in-major-fraud-scheme.html?p=1.
66. Matt Hennie, Former Blake's Owner a Mean, Garish Queen, PROJECT Q
ATLANTA (July 27, 2012, 9:46 AM), http://www.projectqatlanta.com/news
_articles/view/formerblakes owner_a-mean garish-queen.
67. Peter J. Henning, Long Sentences Send a Message Few May Hear,
DEALBOOK (June 27, 2011, 11:56 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/27
/long-white-collar-sentences-send-a-message-few-may-hear/.
68. Matthew Barakat, Feds See Life Term for Mortgage Fraud Mastermind,
HIGHBEAM RES. (June 24, 2011, 1:55 PM), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/lA1
-3605a6eacf96497887e0fd05fa81331b.html.
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of vehicles included a 1963 Rolls Royce, a 1929 Model A, and a 1961
Porsche 356.69 Farkas was besotted with cars. 70
In Ocala, Florida, where Taylor Bean was based, Farkas
sponsored holiday ice-skating parties and symphony events.71 He
bought up abandoned buildings and refurbished them for small local
businesses.72 The executive dining room at Taylor Bean served
pheasant and caviar to employees. 73
3. Farkas's Remorse
When asked at his trial in 2011 if he thought Taylor Bean's
relationship with Colonial Bank allowed the mortgage firm to sell
"fraudulent, counterfeit, fictitious loans" to the bank, Farkas
replied, "[Y]eah, I believe it does. It's very common in our business
to, to sell-because it's all data, there's really nothing but data-to
sell loans that don't exist[.] . . . It happens all the time."7 4
Farkas's claim at sentencing was that he had to "'take risks'
because he couldn't accept the failure of [his company]."75
When it came time to sentence Farkas, Judge Brinkema said, "I
do not detect one bit of actual remorse . . . . You [only] regret getting
caught."76
C. Albert "Jack" Stanley
Jack Stanley pleaded guilty in September 2008 to violating
provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by paying over $180
million in bribes to Nigerian officials on behalf of the construction
company of which he had been chairman and CEO, KBR, Inc.
(formerly Kellogg, Brown & Root).77  After several years of
cooperating with the U.S. Department of Justice, Stanley was
69. The Disgusting $1.5 Billion Mortgage Fraud Scheme Perpetuated by Lee
Farkas, QUEERTY (June 20, 2010), http://www.queerty.com/the-disgusting-1-5
-billion-mortgage-fraud-scheme-perpetuated-by-lee-farkas-20100620/.
70. See Jacqueline Palank, Farkas to Government: Don't Take My Car!,
Bankruptcy Beat, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2012, 3:16 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com
fbankruptcy/2012/03/02/farkas-to-government-dont-take-my-car (recounting
Farkas's plea from prison not to sell a 1954 Cadillac Eldorado, a car Farkas
describes as an "irreplaceable, unique asset").
71. Jacqueline Palank, Letters Show Different Side of Lee Farkas,
Bankruptcy Beat, WALL ST. J. (June 28, 2011, 4:46 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com
/bankruptcy/2011/06/28/letters-show-different-side-of-lee-farkas/.
72. Id.
73. Jury Gets $3B Fraud Case Against Mortgage Company Exec., THE
DAILY REc. (Apr. 18, 2011, 5:28 PM), http://thedailyrecord.com/2011/04/18/jury
-gets-3b-fraud-case-against-mortgage-company-exec/.
74. Norris, supra note 50.
75. Schoenberg, supra note 42.
76. Protess, supra note 43.
77. David Ivanovich & Mary Flood, Ex-KBR Exec Pleads Guilty in $182B
Bribe Scheme, Hous. CHRON. (Sept. 3, 2008), http://www.chron.com/business
/article/Former-KBR-exec-pleads-guilty-in-182M-bribe-1630188.php.
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sentenced to thirty months in prison.7 8 He also agreed to pay
restitution of $10.8 million.79
Graduate student Nnaoka Ufere describes the background of
Stanley's prosecution:
"Jack" Stanley, the 65-year-old chairman and CEO of KBR,
[and a former] senior executive at [KBR's parent] Halliburton,
was legendary for winning billion-dollar contracts in emerging
countries; he seemed to possess a magic wand for dealing with
government officials and winning their trust in countries like
Egypt, Malaysia, Nigeria and Yemen. Those who know
Stanley well describe him as a smart and fearsome competitor,
intent on winning big deals and getting rewarded for his
contributions. His dedication to Halliburton was
unquestionable and he was considered a global rainmaker. He
had it all. But all that changed on one private trip to Abuja,
Nigeria.
Mr. Stanley, according to federal prosecutors, made the
clandestine trip to meet with senior Nigerian officials to figure
out who to bribe and how much to pay. The agreed $182
million bribery greased the palms of Nigerian procurement
officials who reciprocated by awarding a lucrative contract
worth more than $6 billion to Halliburton. Nigerian officials
rewarded Stanley with a "kickback" in the amount of $10.8
million.so
When Stanley faced sentencing, his lawyer argued that,
whatever his crime, Stanley had provided essential information to
the government that led to the recovery of $1.7 billion in fines,
penalties, and forfeited profits from KBR, Halliburton, and others.8 1
During allocution, Stanley informed U.S. District Judge Keith
Ellison that he had been raised on "traditional American values of
hard work, honesty and integrity .... But somewhere along the
way my values were compromised, through ambition, ego or
alcoholism .... Somewhere along the way, I lost touch with Jack
Stanley."82
78. Laurel Brubaker Calkins, Ex-KBR CEO Stanley Gets 2 % years in
Prison for Foreign Bribes, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 24, 2012, 12:01 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-02-23/ex-kbr-ceo-albert-stanley-gets-30
-month-prison-term-in-nigeria-bribe-case.html.
79. Id.
80. Nnaoka Ufere, 'Alcohol Made Me Do It" Rationalizations and CEO
Corrupt Behavior, PRAc. SCHOLAR (May 1, 2012), http://weatherhead.case.edu
/degrees/doctor-management/blog/post.cfm/nnaoke-ufere-alcohol-made-me-do-it-
rationalizations-and-ceo-corrupt-behavior.
81. James Pinkerson, Former KBR Exec. Gets Prison Time in Nigerian
Bribery Scheme, Hous. CHRON. (Feb. 23, 2012, 9:11 PM),
http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Former-KBR-executive
-sentenced-to-prison-in-3357138.php.
82. Calkins, supra note 77.
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D. Gilbert Fiorentino
Gilbert Fiorentino has not been criminally charged. According
to the SEC, however, while Fiorentino was a corporate director and
group CEO of a Fortune 1000 company, he "systematically abused
his position, obtaining payments from vendors and misappropriating
company property. . . ."8 3
The company was Systemax, Inc., which sold personal
computers and consumer electronics through retail stores, direct
mail catalogs, and online, under the trade name CompUSA.84
Fiorentino and his two brothers founded CompUSA in 1987.85
Systemax bought CompUSA in 2008.86 After the purchase,
Fiorentino served as CEO of Systemax's Technology Products
Group, which accounted for over ninety percent of Systemax's total
sales.87
From 2006 through 2010, the SEC alleged, Fiorentino used his
position to obtain over $400,000 in kickbacks from vendors doing
business with Systemax.8 8 "From one manufacturer's
representative that dealt with the company he took part of the
commissions."89 From another, he received monthly payments of
$5,000 to $10,000.90 "During this same period Mr. Fiorentino
routinely misappropriated property [from Systemax] worth several
hundred thousand dollars."91 None of these activities were disclosed
to Systemax or to its shareholders.
Ultimately, Fiorentino's scheme was halted by a whistleblower
complaint, which precipitated an internal investigation and later
83. Thomas 0. Gorman, Director Scofflaw Undone by Whistleblower, SEC
ACTIONS (Sept. 17, 2012, 8:27 AM), http://www.secactions.com/director-scofflaw
-undone-by-whistleblower/.
84. Id.
85. Former Head of Miami-based CompUSA Agrees to SEC Settlement, S.
FLA. Bus. J. (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.bizjournals.com/southflorida/blog
/morning-edition/2012/09/former-compusa-head-agrees-to-sec.html.
86. Systemax Acquires Comp USA Brand and Stores, EWEEK (Jan. 6, 2008),
http://www.eweek.com/c/a/Desktops-and-Notebooks/Systemax-Acquires
-CompUSA-Brand-and-Stores/.
87. Gorman, supra note 82.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. According to one report, Fiorentino and his brothers actually
removed some $17 million worth of electronics from Systemax. See Paul Kunert,
Feds Investigate $17 million of Missing Kit at CompUSA, CHANNEL REG. (July
22, 2011, 1:02 PM), http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2011/07/22/fbi
_investigating-compusa theft/. Systemax has brought suit against Carl and
Patrick Fiorentino for unjust enrichment, civil conspiracy, and breach
of fiduciary duty. Elaine Walker, Lawsuit: Former CompUSA
Executives Stole Millions, McCLATCHY WASH. BUREAU (Jan. 9, 2012),
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2012/01/09/135320/lawsuit-former-compusa-
executives.html.
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Fiorentino's resignation.92  In conjunction with his resignation,
Fiorentino relinquished stock options valued at $9.1 million and
repaid his 2010 annual bonus of $480,000.93
The Commission's complaint against Fiorentino alleged
violations of reporting requirements, certification requirements,
proxy solicitation rules, and the antifraud rule, Rule 10b-5.94 In
September 2012, Fiorentino settled with the SEC for a $65,000 civil
penalty and agreed to be barred from serving as an officer or
director of a public company.95  Nevertheless, Fiorentino still
appears on a vanity web page, describing himself as a "serial
entrepreneur [and] turnaround and acquisition artist."96  "He
specializes in using the transforming power of technology to convert
faltering companies into sustainably profitable enterprises," says
the web page.97 In 2010, before the problems at CompUSA were
revealed, Fiorentino was named one of South Florida's Business
Leaders of the Year.98
E. Jeffery S. Fraser
Jeffery S. Fraser has not been criminally charged. From 1992-
1999 and again from 2002-2008, Fraser was CEO of NIC, Inc., a
Kansas-based company of which he was a cofounder. 99  NIC
manages citizen and business interactions with government
websites. 00
According to the SEC, NIC's public filings from 2002 to 2007
contained several material omissions regarding Fraser's perquisites
of office.10 1 The SEC allege[d] that NIC Inc.'s public filings
92. Gorman, supra note 82.
93. Id.
94. SEC Charges Former Systemax Director in Compensation Scheme,
SEC Litigation Release No. 22,481, 104 SEC Docket 2596 (Sept. 17, 2012).
95. Id.
96. Gilbert Fiorentino, GILBERT FIORENTINO OFFICIAL BLOG PAGE,
http://gilbertfiorentino.co/ (last visited July 12, 2013).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Fraser tells NIC's "origin story" this way:
Eighteen years ago, Ross Hartley and I started the first company in
what would later become NIC, in a small rented apartment in Topeka,
Kan., with a maxed-out credit card, a bartered Internet access node,
and a single state contract for a brand-new concept called a "self-
funded" state information computer dial-up service.
Press Release, NIC, NIC Announces Resignation of Director Jeff Fraser (Sept.
4, 2009), available at http://www.egov.com/Media/PR/Pages/ViewRelease.aspx
?PRID=20090904005385; see also Jeffery Fraser - Former CEO of NIC, Jeffrey
Fraser, PEOPLEPOND, http://peoplepond.com/jefferyfraser (last visited June 12,
2013).
100. NIC, supra note 98.
101. Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges Government Website Provider and
Four Executives with Failure to Disclose CEO Perks (Jan. 12, 2011), available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-8.htm.
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failed to disclose that the company footed the bill for wide-
ranging perks enjoyed by [ ] Fraser, his girlfriend, and his
family-including vacations, computers, and day-to-day
personal living expenses. 102 NIC failed to disclose that it paid
thousands of dollars per month for Fraser to live in a Wyoming
ski lodge and commute by private aircraft to his office at NIC's
Kansas headquarters. 103
Specifically, the SEC alleged that Fraser, who did not have a
personal credit card, routinely charged living expenses on NIC
credit cards and submitted expense vouchers falsely claiming
personal items were business -related in order to have NIC pay for
these personal expenses.104 Fraser also sought reimbursement for
certain expenses that he had not incurred. 105
As a result of the SEC's action, Fraser agreed to pay $1,184,000
in disgorgement, $358,800 in prejudgment interest, and a $500,000
civil penalty. 06 He also consented to the entry of an obey-the-law
injunction against him and an order barring him from serving as an
officer or director of a public company.107
Today, Fraser describes himself as a Ph.D. student and
entrepreneur. 10
F. What Are We to Make of These Narratives?
Certainly most corporate leaders do not behave like the five
CEOs whose stories I have summarized here. Most CEOs--even if
they are voracious self-servers-try to minimize the impact of their
self-interest on shareholders, at least where it can be seen. Still,
these five men's stories are emblematic of what can go wrong when
a CEO becomes unhinged by envy, insecurity, ambition, poor
judgment, greed, unchecked narcissism, or a larcenous heart.
The question before us, then, is: What are the mechanics of
professional derailments like these? What factors play a role when
powerful business leaders self-destruct? Parts II-V will explore four
possible answers.
II. EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, SELF-INTEREST, AND GREED: THE
TRIUMPH OF THE "SELFISH GENE"
Let us begin with this simple premise: man is hard-wired to
look out for himself. As Richard Dawkins frames the issue, "we are
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. JEFFERY FRASER, http://jefferyfraser.net/ (last visited June 12, 2013).
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born selfish" and then we must learn to modify our fundamentally
self-serving instincts in order to become social creatures.109
Certainly, scholarship in recent years has focused more on
altruism and pro-social behavior than on the pursuit of self-
interest. 110 Still, most human beings take care of themselves before
looking out for others. And most human beings-not only those in
the Western world-cherish their status-conferring possessions.111
This desire for possessions-and the acquisitiveness it breeds-
is a product of evolutionary biology: "For our ancestors in a harsh
world, greed paid off in the only currencies that matter to genes-
survival and the ability to have offspring. From them, we have
inherited a greediness that manifests itself today as a desire to
accumulate money and possessions."1 1 2
The question thus inevitably arises: does simple greed explain
the behavior of CEOs who steal from their companies? Perhaps. I
would argue, however, that more than greed is at work when people
in power decide to run off with money and goods to which they are
not entitled. Something more than greed is required when men of
accomplishment, privilege, and power somehow cannot satiate their
desire for more.
III. POWER, RISK, AND THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE BRAIN
Acquiring power in any organization can bring out the best or
the worst in people. As President Abraham Lincoln admonished, "if
you want to test a man's character, give him power." 113
There has been a great deal of scholarship in recent years about
power in both the public and private sectors: how people acquire
it,114 how they exercise it,115 and how it affects their social
interactions.1 1 6
109. RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 3 (1989).
110. See, e.g., STEPHANIE BROWN ET AL., MOVING BEYOND SELF-INTEREST:
PERSPECTIVES FROM EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY, NEUROSCIENCE AND THE SOCIAL
SCIENCES (2012).
111. TERRY BURNHAM & JAY PHELAN, MEAN GENES: FROM SEX TO MONEY TO
FOOD: TAMING OUR PRIMAL INSTINCTS 109 (2000) ("The drive to acquire material
possessions is a human universal.").
112. Id. at 120.
113. Leading Thoughts: Quotes on Character, Leading Thoughts,
LEADERSHIPNOw, http://www.leadershipnow.com/characterquotes.html (last
visited June 6, 2013).
114. See, e.g., ROBERT GREENE, THE 48 LAWS OF POWER (1998); JEFFREY
PFEFFER, POWER: WHY SOME PEOPLE HAVE IT AND OTHERS DON'T (2010)
115. See, e.g., ROBERT A. CARO, THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON: MASTER OF
THE SENATE (2002); DORIS KEARNS GOODWIN, TEAM OF RIVALS: THE POLITICAL
GENIUS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (2005); JOHN MEACHAM, THOMAS JEFFERSON: THE
ART OF POWER (2012).
116. See, e.g., Jacob Hirsh et al., Drunk, Powerful & in the Dark: How
General Processes of Disinhibition Produce Both Prosocial and Antisocial
Behavior, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCl. 415 (2011).
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Recent research by psychologists has begun to unpack the
relationship between a person's sense of power and his willingness
to take risks.117 Management studies have extended this research.
In a 2012 study comparing firms that engaged in subprime lending
with similar firms that did not, the authors found that companies
whose CEOs exhibited a "power" profile were more likely to engage
in subprime lending than those companies whose CEOs did not have
a "power" profile.11s
The authors of the study hypothesized that "those with power
[are likely] to focus on the potential reward aspects of risky behavior
while ignoring potential threats."119 In the case of CEOs, they
reasoned, "the cognitive bias activated by this psychological process
leads the CEO to ignore the downside consequences of risky choices
and to consider only the upside potential." 120
Using proxies for power-whether the CEO was also the board
chair; whether the CEO owned a significant percentage of the
company's stock; whether the CEO was an "expert" as a result of
long tenure with the company; and the CEO's prestige-the authors
found that
CEO ownership and expert power and, to a lesser extent,
structural and prestige power, exert significant main effects on
the likelihood that CEOs engaged in high levels of risk taking
represented by their firms specializing in subprime
mortgages .... [As] CEO tenure lengthened, providing
opportunities to enhance the CEO's expert power by garnering
greater firm-specific knowledge, social capital and confidence,
there was a greater likelihood for a firm to be a subprime
specialist. 121
117. See Cameron Anderson & Adam D. Galinsky, Power, Optimism, and
Risk-taking, 36 EUR. J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 511, 529 (2006) (concluding based on
laboratory studies that a person's sense that he possesses power alters his risk
perceptions and increases risk-taking behavior). The authors state that
"[a]cross five studies, [they] found converging evidence that a heightened sense
of power increases individuals' optimism in viewing risks and their propensity
to engage in risky behavior." Id.
118. See Krista B. Llewellyn & Maureen I. Muller-Kahle, CEO Power and
Risk Taking: Evidence from the Subprime Lending Industry, 20 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: AN INT'L REV. 289, 300, 303 (2012).
119. Id. at 291.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 300. The authors cautioned that "firms with long-tenured CEOs
without an outside owner with substantial equity holdings and board members
who have low tenure may be more prone to have CEOs pursuing excessively
risky strategies, because of their high level of power." Id. at 303. But see
Shams Pathan, Strong Boards, CEO Power and Bank Risk-Taking, 33 J.
BANKING & FIN. 1340 (2009) (finding that strong bank boards positively affect
(that is, encourage) bank risk taking). In contrast, CEO power negatively
affects bank risk taking. The explanation for this outcome is that
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The authors then identified the mechanism by which accretion
of power leads to increased risk taking as being located in the
"approach system" of the brain.122  According to the authors,
activation of the brain's "approach system" provides the link
through which the CEOs of subprime lenders were led "to assume
[an] overly optimistic assessment of the possible consequences of
their actions, and subsequently take risks other executives would
avoid."123
There are limitations, however, to the notion that, simply
because they have acquired power, CEOs necessarily are more likely
to take financial risks than others with less power. Some people in
power become more cautious and conservative, rather than more
acquisitive, in order to retain their power.124 They avoid taking
risks. 125 Importantly, moreover, men's response to power and risk-
taking may differ according to their individual levels of
testosterone, 126 a subject to which we now turn our attention.
if a bank board better represents the bank shareholder's interests,
then there will be greater bank risk-taking because shareholders have
reasons to prefer more risk. Similarly, the CEO power results show
that if bank CEOs have more power or ability to compel board
decisions, then their banks would exhibit less risk since bank
managers (including CEOs) have reason to be risk-averse.
Id. at 1341 (citation omitted).
122. Llewellyn & Muller-Kahle, supra note 117, at 291; see also Biological
Processes in Personality, WILDERDOM, http://www.wilderdom.com/personality/L7
-4BiologicalProcessesPersonality.html (last updated Sept. 1, 2003) ("The
approach system causes one to be both sensitive to potential rewards and
motivated to seek those rewards. Attraction to a person or a chocolate cake and
a desire to approach the person or cake comes from this system (Behavioral
Approach System or BAS)."). The Behavioral Inhibition System, or BIS, "causes
one to be sensitive to potential punishment and motivated to avoid those
punishments. Fear of rejection by someone you fancy or fear of a snake and the
motivation to avoid these things comes from this system." Id.
123. Llewellyn & Muller-Kahle, supra note 117, at 300; see also Po BRONSON
& ASHLEY MERRYMAN, ToP DOG: THE SCIENCE OF WINNING AND LOSING 172-73
(2013) ("The brain does indeed have separate systems, electrically and
chemically distinct. One neural system [the behavioral approach system] is
waiting for something to get excited about, at which point it cranks up and
drives you to action. The other system [the behavioral inhibition system] is
monitoring everything you do like a hovering parent. It's ready to jump in and
stop you from taking a risk or making a careless mistake.").
124. See John K. Maner et al., Power, Risk, and the Status Quo: Does Power
Promote Riskier or More Conservative Decision Making?, 33 PERSONALITY & Soc.
PSYCHOL. BULL. 451, 452 (2007) (finding that, though most studies show that
"power may evoke action, disinhibition, and a tendency to make risky choices,"
circumstances may lead people in power to make more conservative decisions).
125. See id.
126. See generally Richard Ronay & William Von Hippel, Power,
Testosterone, and Risk-taking, 23 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 473 (2010).
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IV. SUCCESS, REINFORCEMENT, AND SELF-DELUSION: TESTOSTERONE
AND THE "WINNER EFFECT"
Human beings are subject to many cognitive biases. 127 We all
experience (and generally benefit from) over-optimism, grandiosity,
and resistance to bad news. 128 People who experience financial
success are especially susceptible to these tendencies. A recent book
by neuroscientist John Coates reveals the biological origin of this
phenomenon: the steroid hormone testosterone.129
Testosterone affects the brain in both animals and humans,
especially those engaged in dominance-seeking behavior.130
Imagine, for example, two lions in the wild.
Two males enter a fight for turf or a contest for a mate and, in
anticipation of the competition, experience a surge in
testosterone, a chemical bracer that that increases their
blood's capacity to carry oxygen and, in time, their lean-muscle
mass. Testosterone also affects the brain, where it increases
the animal's confidence and appetite for risk. After the battle
has been decided the winner emerges with even higher levels
of testosterone, the loser with lower levels. The winner, if he
proceeds to a next round of competition, does so with already
elevated testosterone, and this androgenic priming gives him
an edge, helping him yet again.... However, at some point in
this winning streak the elevated steroids begin to have the
opposite effect on success and survival. Animals experiencing
this upward spiral of testosterone and victory have been found
after a while to start more fights and to spend more time out
in the open, and as a result they suffer an increased mortality.
As testosterone levels rise, confidence and risk taking segue
into overconfidence and reckless behavior.131
Testosterone works in humans in much the same way as it does
in wild animals. For example, humans experience a rise in
testosterone in anticipation of physical combat, such as athletic
contests.132  (Interestingly, they may also experience a rise in
testosterone in anticipation of nonphysical contests, such as chess
matches.)133 Coates characterizes testosterone as the "fuel of
exuberance."13 4
127. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST AND SLOW (2011).
128. See Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias, TIME (May 28, 2011),
http://www.time.com/time/healthlarticle/0,8599,2074067,00.html.
129. JOHN COATES, THE HOUR BETWEEN DOG AND WOLF: RISK TAKING, GUT
FEELINGS AND THE BIOLOGY OF BOOM AND BUST 192 (2012).
130. Id. at 27.
131. Id. at 27-28.
132. BRONSON & MERRYMAN, supra note 122.
133. Id. Sports fans, too, may experience a rise in testosterone before a big
game. "[O]ne group of scientists took testosterone samples from fans before and
after the 1994 football World Cup final between Brazil and Italy. Both teams'
supporters went into the game with elevated testosterone, but when Brazil won
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The similarities between humans and other mammals go
beyond the rise in testosterone in anticipation of combat. There is
also an "upward spiral" of testosterone in those humans who
experience serial combat successes. 135 And, there may even come a
time when elevated testosterone resulting from serial combat
successes leads to foolish risk-taking behavior. This is what Coates
calls the "winner effect."
Coates illustrates these phenomena in humans with an
ingenious experiment conducted using traders in the City of London
as his subjects. 136 Using simple cheek swabs, Coates sampled the
testosterone of the traders at the beginning and the end of their
trading days over a two-week period.137
What we found was that their testosterone levels were
significantly higher [at the end of the] days when they made
an above-average profit. More intriguing, though, was what
we found when we looked at testosterone levels in the
morning, because these predicted how much money the traders
would make in the afternoon. When the traders' morning
testosterone levels were high, they went on to make a lot more
money in the afternoon than they did on days when their
morning testosterone levels were low. Moreover, the difference
in P&L between high and low-testosterone days was large,
amounting in statistical terms to one full standard
deviation ... . 138
In a related experiment, Coates found specifically that the presence
of elevated testosterone in the body increased the risks the traders
took. 139
their fans' testosterone levels rose, while the Italians' crashed." COATES, supra
note 128, at 185.
134. See COATES, supra note 128, at 161.
135. Id. at 182 ("[A]thletes on a winning streak may ... have a very
different body chemistry than those on a losing streak.").
136. Id. at 186.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 186-87. Traders have since cashed in on Coates' insights,
becoming-alongside professional athletes-eager clients of testosterone clinics.
See Cindy Perman, Wall Street's Secret Weapon for Getting an Edge, CNBC
(July 11, 2012, 2:48 PM), http://www.cnbc.comlid/48149955 ("The patient list at
Cenegenics [an anti-aging clinic] ... reads like a Who's Who of Wall Street:
Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, Deutsche Bank, Bank of America, traders from the
New York Stock Exchange and Nasdaq and a lot of hedge funds.").
139. COATES, supra note 128, at 189. Others have made similar findings.
See, e.g., Press Release, Univ. Chi. Booth Bus. Sch., New Study Explores the
Role of Gender, Testosterone in Financial Risk Aversion (Aug. 24, 2009),
available at http://www.chicagobooth.edulabout/newsroom/news/2009/2009-08
-24 (citing Paola Sapienza et al., Gender Differences in Financial Risk Aversion
and Career Choices are Affected by Testosterone, 106 PROCEEDINGS NAT'L AcAD.
Scl. 15,268 (2009)). This study attributes the fact that men are more risk
tolerant than women in making financial decisions to men's much higher levels
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Coates was unable to show experimentally that the "winner
effect"-the progression from simple combat-readiness to self-
destructive, irrational behavior, where "risk taking becomes
increasingly foolish"140-actually happened in the trading room. He
was, however, able to claim to have found "preliminary evidence" of
the winner effect.141 He was also able to imagine, based on his own
trading experience, how the "winner effect" might work.
In the financial world, testosterone feedback loops, once they
start, can cause traders to pass through the early stages of
thrill and excitement, and end up convinced of their own
infallibility. As these cycles rise to their euphoric high point,
one finds traders, most of whom are young males, with
impaired judgment, doing dangerously silly things. Following
the pattern of the winner effect, traders experience a rise in
testosterone when their trades make money, which increases
their confidence and appetite for risk, so that in the next round
of trading they put on even larger trades. If they win again, as
they are likely to during a rising market, their profits will
increase their testosterone once more, until at some point
confidence becomes overconfidence, trading positions grow to a
dangerous size and the risk-reward profiles of the trades start
to stack the odds against them. 142
How might Coates's findings and speculation about the winner
effect ultimately translate into the behavior of wayward CEOs? I
would argue that, as with the London traders, "as profits rise, so
does testosterone."143  And, as testosterone rises, so does one's
willingness to take on added risk.144 Finally, "at some point, as
testosterone builds up, confident risk-taking morphs into
overconfidence and rash behavior." 145
The result is what Bronson and Merryman call "maladaptive
competitiveness."146  Psychiatrist Jonathan Davidson uses a
of testosterone. Id. The study also found that women with higher testosterone
levels were willing to take more risks than women with lower testosterone
levels. Id.
140. COATES, supra note 128.
141. Id. at 190.
142. Id. at 193.
143. Id. at 163.
144. Id. at 192.
145. Id. This build-up of testosterone may specifically make humans more
greedy. See Paul J. Zak et al., Testosterone Administration Decreases Generosity
in Ultimatum Game, PLoS ONE, at 1, (Dec. 16, 2009), avaliable at
http://www.plosone.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri-info%3Adoi%2F10. 1371
%2Fjournal.pone.0008330&representation=PDF.
146. BRONSON & MERRYMAN, supra note 122, at 12 ("Maladaptive
competitiveness is characterized by psychological insecurity and displaced
urges. It's the individual who can't accept that losing is part of competing; it's
the person who competes when others around him are not competing. He has to
be the best at everything, and he can't stop comparing himself to others even
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different term: "hubris syndrome." 147  All three of these
formulations-the "winner effect," "maladaptive competitiveness,"
and "hubris syndrome"-would seem to apply to at least some of the
CEOs whose stories I have told in Part I.
But, is there any evidence to support the application of the
testosterone-based "winner effect" to CEOs? We don't have cheek
swabs or actual records of CEOs' testosterone levels. 148 We may,
however, have some indirect evidence.
Consider older men. . . . Testosterone levels in men rise until
their mid-twenties, then go into a slow decline that accelerates
after the age of fifty. At the same time, cortisol levels [a
hormone that moderates risk-taking] drift upward. As they
age, men may therefore become less and less susceptible to the
testosterone feedback loops that . . . can morph risk taking into
risky behavior. 149
So, is there a difference between the combat behaviors of older
CEOs vis-A-vis younger CEOs? Perhaps. A recent study found that
CEOs younger than forty-five are more likely than older CEOs to
initiate M&A deals.150 (Making an unsolicited offer to acquire a
company is seen as "dominance seeking" behavior.) 151
More interesting in this study was the fact that when younger
CEOs made a takeover bid (a "bear hug") for a company headed by
another young CEO, there was a significant likelihood that the
approach would fail completely or be replaced by a hostile tender
when the competition is over. He doesn't stop when the whistle blows. He
drags others into competitions they don't want to be in, by provoking them.
And he will resort to cheating when he can't win.").
147. David Owen & Jonathan Davidson, Hubris Syndrome: An Acquired
Personality Disorder? A Study of US Presidents and UK Prime Ministers Over
the Last 100 Years, 132 BRAIN 1396, 1397 (2009) ("The key concept is that
hubris syndrome is a disorder [associated with] the possession of power,
particularly power which has been associated with overwhelming success, held
for a period of years and with minimal constraint on the leader.").
148. Some scholars have attempted to use proxies for testosterone levels,
such as the facial width-to-height ratio. E.g., Elaine M. Wong et al., A Face Only
an Investor Could Love: CEOs' Facial Structure Predicts Their Firms' Financial
Performance, 22 PSYCHOL. SCl. 1478 (2011).
149. COATES, supra note 128, at 269-70.
150. Maurice Levi et al., Deal or No Deal: Hormones and the Mergers and
Acquisitions Game, 56 MGMT. SCI. 1462, 1463 (2010) (finding a "positive and
significant association between the male CEO being young and the likelihood of
making an acquisition bid"). But see Felix D. Schonbrodt, Why Using Age as a
Proxy for Testosterone Is a Bad Deal (Mar. 26, 2012) (Ludwig Maximilians Univ.
Munich Working Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=2028882 (challenging the methodology and conclusions of the Levi
study).
151. Levi et al., supra note 149, at 1465 ("[D]ominance can take various
forms, from aggression where the intent is to inflict harm on another person, to
non-aggressive dominance involving enhancing one's status over another.").
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offer. 15 2  Since "tender offers are likely to follow unsuccessful
negotiations-going to the target shareholders after other
negotiations have failed-we would expect such a target CEO effect;
cooperation is less likely from the young, and by implication high-
testosterone, target male CEOs whose dominance is challenged." 153
In thinking about the combative behavior of younger CEOs, one
might consider Facebook's CEO, Mark Zuckerberg, who is now
twenty-nine years old. Facebook has made nearly forty acquisitions
since 2005.154 One of the riskiest of these deals was the $1 billion
acquisition of Instagram, negotiated by Zuckerberg himself over a
junk-food fueled weekend in 2012.155 Critics argued that the
purchase reflected poor strategy on Facebook's part,156 but also that
Instagram's twenty-eight-year old CEO, Kevin Systrom, negotiated
rashly.157  Were either of these CEOs victims of elevated
testosterone or, perhaps, of the "winner effect?" Of course, we
cannot know.
For now, however, let us step back and try to put the
"winner effect" into a modern business context: (1) Ninety-six
percent of public company CEOs are men. 158  (2) These men
presumably have testosterone levels at least as high as (and
probably higher than) other men their age. (3) These men
presumably have been successful in serial rounds of dominance-
seeking (or "combat") behavior. 159 (4) Successful CEOs with a
152. Id. at 1469.
153. Id. at 1475.
154. See List of Mergers and Acquisitions by Facebook, WIKIPEDIA,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilList-ofmergers-andacquisitionsjbyFacebook
(last visited June 11, 2013).
155. See Shayndi Raice et al., In Facebook Deal, Board Was All but Out of
Picture, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 18, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424052702304818404577350191931921290.html; see generally Steven
M. Davidoff, In Silicon Valley, Chieftains Hold Sway with Few Checks and
Balances, N.Y. TIMEs, Jul.. 5, 2012, at B4 (explaining how Silicon Valley CEOs
have the tendency to make decisions without the input of directors or
shareholders and citing as an example the fact that in the Facebook IPO
"[Zuckerberg] reportedly told his board only about 24 hours before the deal was
approved, appearing to present it as a fait accompli").
156. See Molly Wood, Facebook Buys Instagram ... But for What?,
CBSNEWS (Apr. 10, 2012, 9:38 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-205_162
-57411761/facebook-buys-instagram-. . .but-for-what/.
157. Steven M. Davidoff, How Instagram Could Have Cut a Better Deal,
DEALBoOK (Aug. 20, 2012, 9:55 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08
/20/how-instagram-could-have-cut-a-better-deall.
158. Catalyst 2012 Census of Fortune 500: No Change for Women in Top
Leadership, CATALYST (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.catalyst.org/media/catalyst
-2012-census-fortune-500-no-change-women-top-leadership (finding that only
3.8% of Fortune 500 companies are headed by women).
159. Levi et al., supra note 149 ("CEOs are clearly in dominant positions by
virtue of their leading corporate roles: [they] must have sought dominance to be
at the pinnacle of their corporations.").
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history of winning may experience-and ultimately become victims
of-the "winner effect."
V. THE PSYCHOPATHIC CEO
When political or business leaders run off the rails, it is easy
enough to say, "oh well, he was crazy." It turns out, however, that
sometimes that claim may be true. Apparently, "the incidence of
psychopathy among CEOs is about 4 percent, four times what it is in
the population at large."16 0
This assertion should not be surprising. Some of the common
characteristics of psychopaths include glibness, charm, a need for
stimulation, proneness to boredom, and a capacity to manipulate
others. 61 Psychopaths also lack empathy and rarely feel remorse.162
These characteristics, of course, can help advance the careers of
mid-level managers. In other words, psychopathy may be a plus in
the business world, at least up to a point.
In a recent book by British psychologist Kevin Dutton,163 we
learn that, in a 2005 study of three groups of subjects-business
managers, psychiatric patients, and hospitalized criminals-
researchers found that "a number of psychopathic attributes were
actually more common in business leaders than in so-called
disturbed criminals-attributes such as superficial charm,
egocentricity, persuasiveness, lack of empathy, independence, and
focus."164
In a 2010 study, Canadian researcher Robert Hare "handed out
the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised ("PCL-R") to more than two
hundred top U.S. business executives, and compared the prevalence
of psychopathic traits in the corporate world to that found in the
population at large."165 "Not only did the business executives come
out ahead, but psychopathy was positively associated with in-house
ratings of charisma and presentation style: creativity, good strategic
thinking, and excellent communications skills."166
University of Wisconsin psychologist Joe Newman has
concluded that "the combination of low risk aversion and lack of
guilt or remorse, the two central pillars of psychopathy ... may
160. Jeff Bercovici, Why (Some) Psychopaths Make Great CEOs, FORBES
(June 14, 2011, 8:46 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffbercovicil2011/06/14
/why-some-psychopaths-make-great-ceos/.
161. See generally M.E. Thomas, Confessions of a Sociopath: How to Spot a
Sociopath, 46 PSYCHOL. TODAY 53, 56 (2013).
162. Id
163. KEVIN DUTTON, THE WISDOM OF PSYCHOPATHS: WHAT SAINTs, SPIES, AND
SERIAL KILLERS CAN TELL Us ABOUT SUCCESS (2012).
164. Id. at 21.
165. Id. at 105.
166. Id.
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lead, depending on circumstances, to a successful career in either
crime or business. Sometimes both."167
Inevitably, these claims have led to neurological research and
the application of functional MRIs ("fMVIRIs") to psychopaths and
others. There is evidence that the brains of psychopaths process
risk and reward opportunities differently than non-psychopaths.
And those psychopaths who resort to crime "have such a strong
draw to reward-to the carrot-that it overwhelms the sense of risk
or concern about the stick . . .. It's not just that they don't
appreciate the potential threat but that the anticipation or
motivation for reward overwhelms those concerns." 168
Dutton concludes that, for some CEOs, that unquenchable drive
for reward is what ultimately leads them astray. "The psychopath
seeks reward at any cost, flouting consequence and elbowing risk
aside .... Money, power, status, and control . .. together constitute
an irresistible draw for the business-oriented psychopath as he or
she ventures ever further up the rungs of the corporate ladder."169
VI. DISCUSSION
So, how can we account for the troubling-to-shocking behaviors
of Messrs. Wasendorf, Farkas, Stanley, Fiorentino, and Fraser? It is
impossible to know what mix of greed, power, the "winner effect," or
even the presence of a serious brain disorder, contributed to their
downfalls. Nor is it likely that they themselves could disentangle
these threads.
The two themes that run throughout these men's stories,
however, are (1) they felt powerful and yet invisible, seeming to
believe their misconduct would never be uncovered; and (2) their
feeling of invulnerability led them to take extraordinary-and often
escalating-risks.
What made these men think that they could get away with their
misdeeds and escape undetected?
Most white-collar criminals-indeed, most criminals of any type
-enjoy a sense of superiority and dominance over others. 170 (This is
particularly true of Ponzi schemers who exploit social ties and
persuade their victims that they can offer a unique, unbeatable
167. Id. at 63.
168. Id. at 116 (quoting David Zald, who conducted some of the fMRI
studies).
169. Id. at 117.
170. TERRY L. LEAP, DISHONEST DOLLARS: THE DYNAMIcs OF WHITE COLLAR
CRIME 4 (2007) ("[They] regard the world as a chessboard over which they have
total control, and they perceive people as pawns to be pushed around at will.
Trust, love, loyalty, and teamwork are incompatible with their way of life. They
scorn and exploit most people who are kind, trusting, hardworking, and
honest.").
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investment opportunity.)171 White-collar criminals rarely consider
themselves in the same category with "real" criminals, whom they
disdain. 172
White-collar criminals may also be motivated by the acquisition
of power or the trappings of power. Leap describes this pathology as
the "'impatient wealth' phenomenon that emphasizes the rapid and
sometimes dishonest accumulation of tangible assets as a mark of
status and as a source of personal power."173
Finally, white-collar criminals often like to demonstrate their
power and influence in public, self-affirming ways. "[They are] often
pillars of the community. They may participate in fund-raising
efforts for social causes, serve as benefactors for educational
institutions or foundations, and give their time generously to church
groups and volunteer organizations." 174
This latter behavior--conspicuous philanthropy-characterizes
Wasendorf and Farkas and perhaps some of the other men featured
in this Essay. But conspicuous philanthropy is not a reliable
predictor of criminal behavior. (If it were, the members of the board
of the Metropolitan Opera would all be in jail.)
Similarly, conspicuous consumption (Wasendorf, Farkas, and
Fraser); the ownership of bars and restaurants (Wasendorf and
Farkas); and even the use of private jets (Wasendorf, Farkas, and
Fraser) are not predictors of harm. Indeed, these are common
practices among many CEOs.175
171. See Jayne W. Barnard, Deception, Decisions, and Investor Education, 17
ELDER L. J. 201, 205-11 (2010) (describing the techniques Ponzi schemers
employ to lure their victims); Barnard, supra note 49, at 206-12 (describing the
con man's "tool kit").
172. LEAP, supra note 169, at 8.
Board members, executives, managers, politicians, and others who
violate white-collar criminal statutes rarely regard themselves as
criminals. Instead, they are more likely to view themselves as
misunderstood but law-abiding citizens. White-collar criminals use a
variety of ego defense mechanisms to reduce the anxiety associated
with their crimes. [Their] first line of defense for almost all criminals
[is] to deny their misdeeds. When evidence of their guilt is strong,
other rationalizations will likely be used. The term
"misunderstanding" is a staple of the criminal's lexicon. Specifically,
they adopt an innocent posture to reduce the severity of legal
repercussions and to maintain their self-esteem and social status."
Id. at 108-09.
173. Id. at 43.
174. Id. at 117.
175. See Jayne W. Barnard, Narcissism, Over-Optimism, Fear, Anger and
Depression: The Interior Lives of Corporate Leaders, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 408
(noting examples of such activities). Adultery, too, is common among CEOs.
See Joann S. Lublin & Lauren Weber, 2012, A Year of Corner-Office Twists,
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 31, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article
/SB10001424127887323300404578203542770911514.html (noting that
adulterous relationships involving CEOs are a "well-worn genre").
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Being a founder (Wasendorf, Farkas, Fiorentino, and Fraser);
having an alcohol addiction (Stanley and perhaps others); and
exhibiting grandiosity in self-presentation (Wasendorf, Farkas, and
Fiorentino); raise interesting issues but certainly cannot be said to
be reliable indicators of a propensity to crime.
So what is the punch line of this Essay? In my view, there are
three: (1) it is devilishly difficult to know what evil lies in the hearts
of men; (2) the factors driving criminal behavior may be deeply
buried, perhaps even at the molecular level; and (3) power is not
only an aphrodisiac, it may also be a poison.
It is easy enough for someone like me to urge that the
government learn more about the factors that foster fraud.176 The
real question, however, is: Where do we begin? And, while we are
figuring out the answer to that question, we should not delude
ourselves that the agency problem has been solved. The agency
problem may be even worse than we think.
176. See Jayne W. Barnard, Evolutionary Enforcement at the Securities and
Exchange Commission, 71 U. Pirr. L. REV. 403, 419-26 (2010) (recommending
that the SEC create a behavioral unit that would develop expertise about the
biographical, behavioral, and psychological characteristics of securities law
violators).
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